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Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Mine Problem: 
Priority Setting 
W ith so many tasks to complete and limited resources with which to 
complete them, the importance of priority setting to mine action 
cannot be overstated. The author descr ibes how priority setting 
relates to mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina and suggests how 
to go about setting such priorities. 
by Darvin Lisica, 
BHMAC Deputy Director 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Mine Action 
Bosnia and Herzegovina minefield 
information is not completely accurate. 
There are 18,600 minefield records in the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action 
Centre (BHMAC) database, but 25 percent 
of these records are believed to be partially 
incorrect and perhaps up to 40 percent are 
not available. T he suspected risk area in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is estimated to 
be at least 2,100 sq km, which is 
some 4.1 percent of the rota! Bosnia 
and Herzegovina ter ritory. Sin ce the 
beginning of the war in Bosnia and 
H erzegovina, there have been 4,798 
mine victims; 1 1,452 have occurred since 
the cessation of hostilities; 402 of these 
were fatalities. 
The approval of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Demining Law in February 
2002 stimulated the transformation of 
the entire mine action system, and by the 
end of 2002, the original complex and 
disunited management structure was 
integrated into a single BHMAC. At the 
beginning of 200 3, the Council of 
Ministers adopted the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Demining Strategy until 
2010. The Srraregy is based on the 
estimated size of the suspected risk area 
and ways of reducing it in relation to the 
demining resources in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The estimated financial 
requirement to fu lly implement the 
Srrategy is in the order of $333,800,000 
(U.S.)/ most of which should be provided 
through donations. The high level of 
dependence on donations was the 
main reason why a revision of the 
Strategy was planned for 2004. A second 
important reason for a revision was the 
availabili ty of information from the 
Land mine Impact Survey currenrly being 
carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This survey should provide significant new 
input when iris consolidated and analysed 
toward rhe end of2003. 
The humanitaria n demining 
dynamics and flow of funds are insufficient 
to accomplish the goal, i.e., Bosnia and 
Herzegovina being free from the effect of 
mines by 2010. The main reasons for this 
lack of funds are a deep economic crisis 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (although the 
government managed to invest approxi-
mately $5,280,000 in 2002, which was 
four rimes more than planned3) and 
unexpectedly low funding from donors. 
This financial reality has brought greater 
attention to risk management since the 
beginning of 2003, in conjunction with 
preparations for more intensive implementa-
tion of emergency and permanent marking, 
mine risk education and teclmical survey. 
Regardless of the fact that all the 
elements of mine action are in place in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it cannot be 
expected that such a huge mine 
problem be resolved quickly and simply. 
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In this complex context, the decision 
makers should have a clearer picture of 
the options open to them in the sequence 
of risk management and reduction. For 
this reason, priority setting is the central 
issue in managing the mine problem. 
New Priority-Setting 
Model to be Developed 
"Priority setting is necessary when 
money, time and staff are limited."' This 
statement clearly defines the nature of the 
problem that confronts all participants in 
mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where the slow pace of humanitarian 
demining operations frustrates not only 
the experts, but also the people, the authorities 
and the donors, all of whom expect 
visib le resu lts in a short time. 5 
The priority-setting model used so 
far suffered from several disadvantages: 
there was no finite sequence in the 
priority li st, the procedure for decision 
making on how to treat the risk was 
complex, and the final choice was relatively 
subjective as it is simply difficult to 
separate the highest priority from a 
large group of generally important tasks. 
In this environment, the first objective 
that was set was that quality analysis 
should "divide the subject of research into 
irs components, i.e., structure facrors, 
functions, communications and relations 
on a certain area in a certain period of 
time."6 A second objective was to provide 
continuity within mine action in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and a third objective 
was based on the need to apply scienti fic 
methods of qualitative and quantitative 
measuring of priority setting. These 
techniques are mutually conditioned and 
linked and cannot be applied separately. 
The subject of our research is the 
mine problem, and within that main 
component is the assessment of risk and 
its conseq uences . Therefore, all 
prioritisation systems must be based on a 
risk management model. The main ele-
ments of the risk management process are 
establishment of the context, identification, 
analysis, evaluation and treatment of the 
problem (risk).7 Identification and analy-
sis, resulting in classification of priorities 
and the evaluation with which it is pos-
sible to rank them within classes, are pres-
enrly fundamentals of priority setting. At 
the core of identification and analysis 
process is the risk expressed through the 
threat (which is clear risk) and irs socio-
economic impact (which is dynamic risk). 
They are both conditioned by likelihood 
and consequences. 
threat classification 
threat consequences of inciderts 
analysis 
matrix- fatal injuries no no 11ictlms incidents 
threat level 
almost VH VH H M certain 
likelihood 
of likely VH H M L 
minefield 
unlikely H M L NO 
. . 
I Th reat classifiCation table . 
The decisive indicators for measuring 
threats are the consequences of incidents 
and the likelihood of existence of 
minefields. The decisive indicators for the 
socio-economic impacts are the current 
negative mine impact on communities 
and potential benefits for mine action . 
All indicators are qualitative. 
The data about the consequences of 
incidents and the likelihood of the 
exis tence of minefie lds are avai lable 
through the existing BHMAC data-
base and through the results of survey. 
The level of impact on communities will 
be the result of the current Landmine Impact 
Survey and the existing priority system, 
modified by the results of the task assess-
ment and planning process, which should 
provide a better picture of the potential 
benefits that results from mine action. 
Identification and analysis provide 
better planning as a function of manage-
ment for choosing the most efficient 
direction to achieve the goals set (i.e., 
improved structure of activities and 
resource management,8 establishment of 
the registry of affected communities and 
the registry of mined locations grouped 
by priorities, and development community 
action plans). Determination of priority 
level is achieved through qualitative 
measurement. The basis for applying 
qual itative qualification as a means for 
managing information9 and reaching 
the priority level is achieved by dividing 
the mine problem inro more specific 
problems and their main characteristics. 
If priority evaluation is looked upon 
as a part of risk management, then it can 
be defined as a comparison of priority 
levels with rhe previously established 
criteria for evaluating the contamination 
problem. 10 These criteria may vary from 
country to country depending on the 
strategic goals set, country policy, economic 
situation, resources available and other 
factors. There are different quantitative 
methods of multi-criteria analysis for 
measuring and evaluating risk defined in 
different software packages, bur these 
shall not be separately addressed in 
th is article. 
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C lassification is a type of measuring, 
meaning that the scale must be chosen 
and established based on instruments of 
information collected. 11 Qualitative 
classification cannot be a substitute for 
quantitative measuring, but it does 
precede it in principle. The value of quali-
tative classification is multiple. Apart from 
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providing the starting 
locations according to the priority 
groups, it comprises within itself a ll 
r he criteria that acrually cannot be measured 
in the process of risk evaluation and 
determination of the individual rank 
for every location. 
By identifying and analysing a mine 
problem, a choice can be made based on 
the most important mine risk indicators 
and socio-economic impact and the scales 
for each indicaror are defined separately. 
Characteristics and instruments for 
gathering information abom chosen 
indicators for qualitative classification 
condition the construction of the scale. 
The choice of matrixes for quali-
tative measurement and analysis is not 
accidental; rather, it is recommended by 
different risk management standards. In 
this case, rhe matrixes represent the 
modified application of the Australian 
and New Zealand Srandards. 12 
The threat level is determined by 
threat analys is matrix. This matrix is 
obtained by combining the scale of 
consequences of incident with rhe scale 
of likelihood of existence of minefield. 
impact potential benefits 
analysis 
matrix- 1. priority 2. priority 3. priority 
impact level 
high VH H 
current 
negative medium H M 
impact 
M L low 
The level of socio-economic impact 
is assessed by using the impact analysis 
matrix. This matrix is obtained by 
combining rhe scale of curren t negative 
impact on communities with the 
prioritised scale of potential benefits. 
location tlwutleftl 
analysis 
matrix- very high medium high 
priority level 
very high 1 2 3 
high 2 3 3 
Impact 
medium 4 4 4 level 
ION 5 5 6 




I Threat ana lysts table. 
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identification 
and analysis. 
T he results of matrix usage are the 
scales of the threat level and the socio-
economic impact level with equal number 
of classes. These nvo scales will be used to 
construct the matrix for location analysis, 
which willaltea the priority level classification 
oflocations. By combining these scales, we get 
classes, each of them being a priority level. 
The distribu tion of the priori ty levels 
withi n the matrix depends on the 
assessment of the importance of specific 
criteria, which is always an executive/ 
management decision. In this case, it 
is ou r es timation that the centre of 
gravity in t he selection of priorities 




Every ri sk micro-location where 
general survey was conducted is subjecr 
to qualitative classification. The ultimate 
result will be the initial list of priori ties 
grouped through levels of priority and 
ready for quanti tative analysis. 
Final Considerations 
Mine action tn Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a process wi th a large 
number of interested parries participating 
at the same time, often with different and 
conflicting interests and aims. Therefore, 
it is necessary to es tablish a hierarchy 
within mine action goals. T his hierarchy 
is not only strategic, bur also includes the 
goals and the in rerests expressed at a lower 
level , down ro rhe local community. It is 
at the basic level of the local community 
rhar mo st misunderstand in gs and 
subjectivity in priority selection appear. 
Correct priority setting is a transparent 
process with a clear choice of areas and 
activities rhar will most efficiently reduce 
the risk and bring benefi ts to Bosnia and 
H erzegovina. It is a key factor in influencing 
the will of the donors to continue supporting 
mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and mine action decision makers must 
therefore base their decisions upon 
scien tific and unbi ased models for 
risk management. 
T he current status of mine action, 
the availability and accessibil iry of infor-
mation, the transformation of BHMAC 
operational management system and new 
information from the Landmine Impact 
Survey all work to open possibilities for 
developing a new model for mine action 
prior ity setting in Bos nia and 
Herzegovina. This "new model" is the 
"missing link " benveen rhe large scope of 
work done gath ering and assessing 
information , and planning and raking 
actions to solve the mine problem. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, we now have 
the chance to do this. • 
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• 1n Bih Demining ac 
With 5 Korpusa of the 
Bosnian Army 
Despite the end to years of brutal fighting in Bosnia, land mines left behind 
from the war still threaten the safety of local populations. The following 
article gives a firsthand account of a former Canadian soldier's demining 
experience in Bosnia alongside the Bosnian Army. 
by Peter Hindy, Former 
Canadian Soldier 
Introduction 
On September 12, 200 I , I arrived 
under guard at work and made my way 
to rhe rop of the hill in Cekrilje, Bihac, 
Bosnia. I had a very strange, yet distinct 
sinking feel ing from the tragedies of the 
terrorist attacks of the previous day. As I 
walked up the hill, I felt that I would have 
to somehow prove past rhe usual morning 
smile and cheerfulness that I was not 
personally angry and vengeful at the 
Muslim world for rhe actions taken by the 
poor excuses for soldiers who committed 
the attacks against the innocent people of 
New York. My entire ream was Muslims 
and these brave men fought for the 5'" 
Corps of the Bosnian Army (B5SWl) 
and for what they thought was right. 
T hey were the finest people I have 
ever known. 
At first, the deminers would nor 
initiate the usual conversarion and a few 
stared at the ground. I explained to the 
other deminers that it was normal to feel 
tentative today towards me, a Westerner, 
as such a terrible thing had happened. 
After a short period of hesitant conversa-
tion, I was presented with the following 
statement. "Now p eople in America 
know what it was like in my rown every 
day. " The remark was nor spoken in a 
harsh tone, but rather was relayed in a 
somber, respectful manner. After all, these 
men had been surrounded by brutal 
fighting in their proud satellite town of 
Bihac for 1,200 plus days against over-
whelming forces. They held their own for 
that entire battle through the good and 
the bad rimes. Even though the rest of 
the town has tried to get back to life after 
eight years of brutal conflict, these men 
are still fighting that same battle on the 
ground they had been on in July of 1995 
in C ekrilje. The Serbs may have been 
defeated, but the mines are still standing 
awaiting their victims with patience and 
steadfast, ruthless dedication. But as terrible 
as these mines are, they do nothing to dampen 
the efforts of the sterling, professional 
character of the deminers of 5 Korpusa. 
• BSSW1 Team medic and two partners in 
crime, relax in the ad min area. 
Ghosts of the Battlefield 
The minefield being cleared here 
roday is one of many laid in 1992 during 
the conflict. In fact, 60 p ercent of these 
mines are unknown and unmarked, and 
the persons who laid them may be long 
dead. The belts of protective and tactical 
minefields on this land in this particular 
field of 50,000 square meters changed 
hands as many as nine times during 
• 17 • 
bloody battles to hold just a few hundred 
yards either way. Men died raking this 
ground. Sometimes photos, watches and 
other personal items are found-testament 
to what the world allowed to happen here 
in this country nvo hours from London. 
For rhe men ofB5SWl , rhewarcontinues 
on daily from seven AM ro nvo PM in the 
more than 30oC hear. Sweat, headaches, 
dirt, lack of proper food and water at 
times and the never-ending attention ro 
derail to not become complacent were 
amo ngs t rhe problems we faced. 
Complacency means d eath. But still 
the morale is maintained and life goes on 
through the good and the bad rimes in 
the demining business. 
There are many reasons for each man 
to pay attention to ensure this rough job 
gets done righr-rhe greatest of which is 
the human cost of war. I was reminded 
of the human casualties daily in rhe 
distance by the white patch ofBosnian and 
international volunteer fighters buried on 
the horiw n in the military cemetery, and 
by the tombstones bearing the names of 
rhe dead, such as Vukovar, Laslovo, and 
Srebrencia. These men paid the ultimate 
sacrifice for freedom, and the nine men 
of B5SW1 were re-enforcing the success 
of every soldier who died trying to do the 
right thing. Every day under the gentle 
wind and thunderous silence of peace, rhe 
team carefully advances further into the 
ground that had not been ventured on 
since tracers splir the air and screaming 
hot shrapnel and violent explosions rore 
lives and hopes for the fuwre from sons 
of fathers and mothers with an imal-like 
2
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